--- title: The Silent Fleet: AUVs -- Autonomous Underwater Vehicles author: Amitay Dan --- |=- The Silent Fleet -=| |=- Research Underwater Vehicles Exposed to the Internet -=| |=- AUVs -- Autonomous Underwater Vehicles -=| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |=[ Author ]=---[ Amitay Dan ]-=| |=[ Contact ]=---[ amitaydan.com ]-=| |=[ Date ]=---[ June 2026 (research: 2018) ]-=| ============================================================================ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table of Contents ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0x01 Introduction 0x02 Background, Methodology, and Vessels 0x03 The Weapon: Slocum Glider AUV 0x04 Dock Server Hardware -- Ground Control to Major Tom 0x05 Findings 0x05.a Unrestricted Web Console Access 0x05.b Open Iridium Satellite API 0x05.c Plaintext FTP -- Full Filesystem Exposed 0x05.d Java Web Start Code Injection (MitM) 0x05.e One-Packet DoS 0x05.f "Light Encoding" != Encryption 0x05.g Real-Time GPS Tracking 0x05.h Default Credentials + Indexed Forum 0x06 A Decade, Three Generations, Zero Security Change 0x07 The New System (SFMC) -- Still Searchable 0x08 Recommendations 0x09 Conclusion 0x0A Full Disclosure 0x0B References ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0x01. Introduction What drives someone to deploy autonomous underwater vehicles to the open sea with zero security? Unlike a server whose password can be reset, these are research tools that function like underwater satellites. If one locks up because someone forgot a password, years of academic work are destroyed. That tension -- security vs. operability -- is baked into the architecture. This paper documents a systematic OSINT sweep that located more than 13 active Dock Servers (the shore-side command control for Slocum Gliders) exposed on the open internet, across six countries, managing 25+ deployed vehicles. 12 of 13 required zero authentication. The findings span eight distinct vulnerability classes, from unauthenticated web consoles to Man-in-the-Middle Java code injection and full control of the glider. The vehicles are dual-use. The U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFCC) explicitly lists them for Amphibious Warfare (AMW), Mine Warfare (MIW), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), and Special Operations support. In 2016, a Chinese Navy vessel seized an identical Slocum Glider belonging to the U.S. Navy in the South China Sea. The lesson was not learned. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ABSTRACT The Glider Mission Control (GMC) infrastructure -- C2 for the Slocum autonomous underwater glider -- was accessible from the open internet at universities and research institutions for many years without authentication. A hostile actor could: track glider GPS in real time, exfiltrate scientific data, issue navigation commands, upload malicious mission files, brick the science computer, and pivot into the host institution's network all without exploits. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0x02. Background, Methodology, and Vessels The Slocum Glider is designed and manufactured by Teledyne Webb Research (Falmouth, MA). It propels itself by cycling buoyancy -- a ballast motor shifts the center of mass, the wings convert vertical motion into horizontal glide. in some models no propeller others has others has hybrid abilities with propellor and cycling buoyancy. Up to 1,000 m depth. Missions can last months. Communication happens when the vehicle surfaces every few hours and dials home over Iridium satellite (RUDICS). The shore-side endpoint is the Dock Server -- a Linux box running Glider Mission Control (GMC) software. From GMC, operators plan missions, push waypoint files, download science data, and monitor vehicle state. Relevant threat context: AMW - Amphibious Warfare: landing forces from sea MIW - Mine Warfare: mine detection and emplacement ASW - Anti-Submarine Warfare: hunting submarines SOCOM - Special Operations integration The official operator manual explicitly tells users NOT to enable glider authentication: ............................................................................ "Glider Authentication Gliders connecting to a dock server via Iridium RUDICS may optionally be required to authenticate before being allowed access to the dock server. Unless there are compelling reasons to require glider authentication, it is recommended NOT to use this capability. It is difficult enough to communicate with a glider at sea without the additional hurdle of a login sequence. It increases the probability that a glider at sea will be incommunicado due to misconfiguration, software error, corrupt file, lost password, etc." -- Slocum Gliders Operator Manual (official documentation) ............................................................................ -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0x03. The Target: Slocum Glider AUV The Slocum Glider is not a toy. A yellow cylinder roughly 2 m long and 20 cm in diameter, it travels at ~0.5 knots consuming milliwatts. It can carry CTD sensors, acoustic modems, hydrophones, or whatever payload the mission demands. From the surface it cannot be distinguished from ocean debris. It surfaces for ~2 minutes per dive cycle, transmits via Iridium, and submerges again. An attacker watching the satellite call log knows exactly when and where to intercept it. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0x04. Dock Server Hardware -- Ground Control to Major Tom Every Slocum deployment relies on a shore-side server running GMC (Glider Mission Control). This Linux box: - Accepts inbound Iridium RUDICS TCP connections from gliders - Serves the web management console (port 80 / 443) - Exposes an FTP server for file exchange with gliders - Distributes Java Web Start (JNLP) control applications - Stores all mission data, GPS logs, and satellite call records The Dock Server is the single point of control for every vehicle it manages. Compromise the Dock Server; own the fleet. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0x05. Findings ---[ 0x05.a - Unrestricted Web Console Access ]--- Discovery: A Censys search for the string "Webb Research Glider Mission Control" returned 12 unique IPv4 addresses. Cross-referenced with Shodan, ZoomEye, and FOFA, plus Google Dorks ("GLMPC Terminal", "Glider Terminal"), the final list was 13+ active Dock Servers across 6 countries. Exposed organizations (partial list): [ USA ] Mote Marine Laboratory (FL) [ USA ] Oregon State University (Backup) [ USA ] Skidaway Institute / Univ. of Georgia [ AUSTRALIA ] CSIRO (national science agency) [SOUTH KOREA ] Kyungpook National University [NEW ZEALAND ] REANNZ research network 12 of 13 servers required zero authentication. No username, no password, no token. One browser request --> full console access: - Active glider list with real-time status - Satellite call history - Mission control buttons - All operational data The one server with a barrier used HTTP Basic Auth ("Restricted Files"). Not IP restriction. Not VPN. Basic auth over HTTPS. Visible glider names: mote-genie, kg_557, unit_416, ramses, pelagia, bob. The naming convention "ramses" is a name worth noting. ---[ 0x05.b - Open Iridium Satellite API ]--- Every Dock Server exposed an unauthenticated CGI endpoint returning the complete Iridium satellite call log: .-----------------------------------------------------------------. | GET /cgi-bin/gmc/list-iridium-results.pl?time=365 | | | | Returns: timestamp (epoch + human), glider ID, call duration | | No auth. No rate limit. ?time= accepts any integer. | '-----------------------------------------------------------------' The Skidaway Institute server (Univ. of Georgia) exposed 1,770 calls over a single year. Analysis of glider "pelagia" showed surfacing every ~7 minutes -- classic Pitch Mechanism Failure. Same signature in kg_557 (South Korea): "pitch not commanded" errors repeating for 7 days straight. An actor could monitor this feed to predict surfacing windows and intercept the vehicle at a known GPS position. ---[ 0x05.c - Plaintext FTP -- Full Filesystem Exposed ]--- GMC FTP Utility (based on FTP-Go v1.6) connects to the Dock Server via plaintext FTP. No SFTP. No TLS. Credentials and data in the clear. FTP root directory contents: / |-- to-glider/ <- WRITE: push mission files (.ma) to vehicle | |-- *.ma (waypoints, behaviors, commands) | |-- from-glider/ <- raw vehicle data |-- from-science/ <- raw science payload data |-- dockserver.conf <- server config, cleartext |-- gliderState.xml <- real-time status, >100 KB `-- surface.dat <- per-surfacing network logs Attacker could make new missions new routes and cancel previous missions and routes. Moreover Attackers were able to force security and add passwords, so original operator will be out of control. ---[ 0x05.d - Java Web Start Code Injection (MitM) ]--- All the GMC control tools (Glider Terminal, GLMPC Terminal, Data Visualizer) are distributed as Java Web Start (JNLP) packages served over plain HTTP. The JAR files carry: MitM position --> swap the JAR --> full OS execution on researcher workstation: - Malware persistence - Credential harvesting - Lateral movement into university / lab internal network Java Web Start was deprecated in Java 11 (Sept 2018). These systems required legacy Java 8, a version with a backlog of CVEs. Same attack surface applies to file uploads targeting the science computer. ---[ 0x05.e - One-Packet DoS ]--- From the official Dock Server User Guide v7.14 (2013): ,-----------------------------------------------------------------. | "When Dock Server launches, it opens serial ports and network | | sockets. At any time, these resources can be owned by only a | | single process... do not start more than one instance." | '-----------------------------------------------------------------' The Glider Terminal socket accepts inbound connections without auth. One TCP connect from an attacker --> socket is owned --> legitimate research team cannot communicate with their vehicle for the duration of the connection. No CVE. No exploit. Just: nc . ---[ 0x05.f - "Light Encoding" != Encryption ]--- FTP-Go documentation states all server credentials are stored with "light encoding" -- their term for obfuscation, not cryptographic encryption. One tested server (Australian organization): Application Lock set to "Leave unlocked". All FTP credentials for all managed Dock Servers stored in a single unprotected, trivially-decoded file. ---[ 0x05.g - Real-Time GPS Tracking ]--- Event logs on FTP contain precise GPS coordinates for every surfacing event, timestamped to the second: Combined with the Iridium call API: full real-time tracking of every deployed glider, globally, from any browser, with no credentials. This is not theoretical. China physically seized an identical U.S. Navy Slocum Glider in the South China Sea (Dec 2016). The vehicle was returned after diplomatic protest. The surfacing pattern and GPS data were publicly visible on the exposed Dock Servers. ---[ 0x05.h - Default Credentials + Indexed Forum ]--- Evidence of unchanged factory credentials and hardcoded passwords found across multiple servers. Official support forum (datahost.webbresearch.com) had no robots.txt. All troubleshooting discussions, operational configurations, and support tickets indexed by Google. Query: site:datahost.webbresearch.com Official manual section 14.3.1.3 confirms the PAM authentication design is deliberately left non-functional: "...support is NOT available from Webb Research Corporation. If you do not know how to create a user account, you should not configure gliders to authenticate. If you cannot reconfigure PAM without help, you should not change it." -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0x06. A Decade, Three Generations, Zero Security Change Year Event Notes ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 2010 G1 released Plaintext FTP. No auth. HTTP JARs. 2012 G2 released Same architecture. Same vulns. 2013 GMC v7.14 DoS documented in official manual. 2014 G2 Training Guide Same 2016 China seizes Navy AUV South China Sea. Identical vehicle. 2017 G3 released Same architecture. Same vulns. 2018 This research 13+ servers found globally. 2018 Initial disclosure 22.09.2018 to Teledyne Webb Research. Phone call with no official response 2023 New system improved security 2024 Follow-up disclosure 22.01.2024. No response. 2025 Slocum G3S 2026 Publication Responsible disclosure. Most patched. Across three hardware generations and seven years of official documentation, not one substantive change to the security architecture. The plaintext FTP, the absent auth, the HTTP-served JARs -- present in G1 (2010), present in G3 (2017). -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0x07. The New System (SFMC) -- Still Searchable Teledyne Webb Research eventually produced Slocum Fleet Mission Control (SFMC), which adds HTTPS and a login form. It is findable with: Shodan/Censys/Fofa: "/sfmc/login" "/sfmc/login" && title=="SFMC - Login" "/sfmc/about" Satellite call logs (no GPS, but operational metadata): /sfmc/iridium-calls Dozens of SFMC instances remain internet-exposed. The security model is "username + password, no VPN required." Modern operational guides now require periodic password changes. In the balance between operability and security -- operability still leads. The conceptual gap remains. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0x08. Recommendations to the old system [CRITICAL] * Put GMC/SFMC behind VPN or institutional IP whitelist. * Authenticate ALL CGI endpoints including the Iridium API. * Replace factory/default credentials immediately. [HIGH] * Replace FTP with SFTP or SCP for all transfers. * Serve JNLP/JAR over HTTPS with valid TLS cert. * Retire Java Web Start; use modern authenticated web UI. * Require auth before accepting Glider Terminal TCP connections. [MEDIUM] * Enable FTP-Go Application Lock with strong password. * OpSec policy: do not expose real-time GPS externally. [LOW] * Add robots.txt to support forum. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0x09. Conclusion The Slocum gliders are an engineering achievement. Quiet machines that traverse the oceans and return knowledge -- maritime satellites with wings. Their Command and Control was built with the mindset of an open academic laboratory, not a system controlling dual-use assets at sea. The developer documented the insecurity. The clients deployed without even minimum hardening. When notified, the response was that the vehicle "is like a turtle that sails very slowly and you can't hurt it." This statement was made after China physically seized an identical vessel. If you want to damage academic research, steal commercial secrets, or locate dual-use research platforms for collection -- these naive assumptions are the foundation that makes it possible. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0x0A. Full Disclosure Outreach to Teledyne Webb Research was made multiple times over several years. The remediation timeline: 22.09.2018 -- First response from company. Followed by emails and a direct phone call with the systems manager. 2018-2023 -- No official statement. Users continued operating unsecured vehicles. 22.01.2024 -- Second outreach to InfoSec department. No response. June 2026 -- Publication. Most clients have updated. This article was originally written in 2018 and withheld given the dual-use sensitivity of the vehicles. It is published now because the majority of affected systems have been remediated. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0x0B. References [1] Slocum G1 Glider Manual (2010) https://gliderfs.coas.oregonstate.edu/gliderweb/docs/ slocum_manuals/Slocum_G1_Glider_Manual.pdf [2] Slocum G2 Operators Manual Rev.B (2012) https://gliderfs.coas.oregonstate.edu/gliderweb/docs/ slocum_manuals/Slocum_G2_Glider_Operators_Manual.pdf [3] Slocum G2 Operators Training Guide (2014) https://gliderfs.coas.oregonstate.edu/gliderweb/docs/ slocum_manuals/Slocum_Glider_Operators_Training_Guide.pdf [4] Slocum Glider Operators Guidebook (2010) https://wiki-pnb.eri.ucsb.edu/images/f/f2/ Glider_operators_handbook.pdf [5] Slocum G3 Operators Manual Rev.2 (2017) https://gliderfs.coas.oregonstate.edu/gliderweb/docs/ slocum_manuals/Slocum_G3_Operator_Manual_20171219.pdf [6] GMC Dock Server User Guide Rev 7.14 (2013) https://dockserver.skio.uga.edu/gmc/gmcUserGuide.pdf [7] Censys query https://censys.io/ipv4?q="Webb+Research+Glider+Mission+Control" [8] Shodan query https://www.shodan.io/search?query= "Webb+Research+Glider+Mission+Control" [9] ZoomEye query https://www.zoomeye.org/searchResult?q= %22Webb%20Research%20Glider%20Mission%20Control%22 [10] TWR Forum https://datahost.webbresearch.com [11] A Hometown Glider Makes World News https://www.capenews.net/falmouth/news/ a-hometown-glider-makes-world-news/ [12] China Gives Drone Back -- But Why Did They Grab It? https://www.twz.com/6604/china-gives-drone-back-but-why- did-they-grab-it-in-the-first-place [13] Pentagon Press Secretary Statement https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/1032611/ [14] United States Fleet Forces Command (Wikipedia) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Fleet_Forces_Command [15] Oregon State University -- Glider Resources 2026 https://gliderfs2.oce.orst.edu/gliderweb/slocumgliders.php [16] G3S Glider Operator Manual 2025 https://gliderfs2.oce.orst.edu/gliderweb/docs/slocum_manuals/ G3S%20Glider%20Operator%20Manual%202025-07-18.pdf [17] Slocum G3S Glider Operator Manual P/N M311172-NFC, Rev. A https://gliderfs2.coas.oregonstate.edu/gliderweb/docs/slocum_manuals/ G3S%20Glider%20Operator%20Manual%202025-07-18.pdf [18] SFMC Installation Guide [M313589-NFC, Rev B] Software Ver 8.7.0-1 https://gliderfs2.oce.orst.edu/gliderweb/docs/slocum_manuals/ SFMC%20Installation%20Guide%20[M313589-NFC,%20Rev%20B] %20Software%20Ver%208.7.0-1.pdf ============================================================================ [ EOF ] Amitay Dan -- June 2026 -- Responsible Disclosure amitaydan.com | x.com/popshark1 ============================================================================